They used to say that if you owed £100 it was your problem, but if you owed £100,000 it was the bank’s problem. With the UK government (after the Northern Rock crisis) now guaranteeing all savers’ deposits, it now seems that if the bank owes £100m, that’s the taxpayer’s problem.
Many people, particularly those of a free-market bent, regard the Chancellor’s guarantee as folly, because it creates ‘moral hazard’ – in other words, banks will be prepared to act even more riskily in the hope of picking up marginal business, knowing that if it all goes wrong, they and their customers will not lose out. Recently on this blog I argued the opposite, saying that the prospect of Northern Rock losing its reputation and its business over a single weekend must make others wary of skating on too thin ice, guarantees notwithstanding.
Now I’m not so sure. The shareholders of Northern Rock have been told they won’t get a dividend, of course, but the directors are still in line for healthy bonuses, based on the jet-fuelled growth of the bank over the last year. Now that definitely is moral hazard. Not just in banking, but in other sectors too, the rational strategy for managers seems to be to take whatever risks you need to make your business go like a rocket, and retire on your performance-related bonus just before the whole thing explodes.
I have long believed that company law gives too much power to managers and too little to shareholders. Unless there are really stiff penalties on managers who mess things up, we could see still more of these crises in the future.
From Adam Smith Institute
Tags: Libertarian, Politics, Liberty, Freedom